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Abstract  
 
This paper seeks to offer an empirical contribution of the political processes, limits 
and potential of UN brokered partnerships that seek to deepen or create inclusive and 
sustainable agricultural supply chains in sub-Saharan Africa. More specifically it 
appraises the local processes of partnership brokerage, decision-making mechanisms 
and project implementation within the UNDP’s Growing Sustainable Business 
Initiative (GSB) in Kenya. The paper argues that the lack of bottom-up participation 
in decision-making mechanisms and the predominantly economic imperatives driving 
the partnership projects have failed to reach out to the partnerships’ intended 
beneficiaries – Kenyan small producers of nuts and mangoes. Opening up the GSB 
platform and monitoring the developmental impact of its partnership projects might 
hold the promise of reconciling sustainable business models with (some) poverty 
reduction.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
In recent years, the relationship between the private sector and development has 
witnessed a resurgence of interest within academic and policy circles. Corporate 
philanthropy, the traditional form of private sector assistance to many low-income 
countries, development initiative and government-led efforts, has been progressively 
amplified (Utting and Zammit 2006: 5); the practices of and pledges to corporate 
social responsibility are often narrated within a developmental and progressive 
dimension; groups of businesses through private initiatives such as ‘Business Action 
for Africa’ or in conjunction with multilateral organisations, donors, NGOs and 
unions have forged partnerships, agreements and campaigns in support of specific 
development priorities and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The 
emergence and rise of these activities have also been accompanied by the emergence 
of a new consensus, namely one which views the private sector as a developmental 
agent by virtue of contributing to economic growth, creating jobs, raising income and 
empowering the poor by providing a range of products and services (UN Commission 
2004; World Bank 2005; UNDP 2006).  
 
Since the creation of the UN Global Compact in 2000 and, two years later, the 
affirmation of the role of the private sector as a key development partner at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development, the UN has now established itself as one of the 
most prominent advocate and initiator of partnerships for development with the 
private sector. The concept of partnership, does not entail an exclusive relation 
between the UN and the private sector, other actors such as governments, NGOs, 
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unions and academia are encouraged to work together with businesses and the UN to 
undertake a specific project and ‘share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies 
and benefits’ (UN General Assembly 2003: 4). The partnership rationale has gained 
prominence not only because of its pragmatism, inclusive features and potential 
contribution to development but also because of its ‘win-win’ appeal, as public, 
private actor involved in a partnership and their beneficiaries stand to benefit 
financially, in terms of reputation or efficiency (Nelson 2002). 
 
Witte and Reinicke (2005) have argued that despite financial and human resources 
constraints the partnerships approach is becoming fully embedded in the UN’s modus 
operandi. Evidence for this is provided by the growth of partnerships portfolios 
amongst leading and lesser prominent agencies, the appointment of partnership 
brokers also known as ‘focal points’, the efforts to de-centralise their management to 
country offices, the development of tailored guidelines for engagement with business 
and civil society, and the mushrooming of websites and publications geared towards 
enhancing the profile of particular partnership initiative and attracting new partners. 
No comprehensive database of UN partnerships exists, however recent estimates 
suggest that there are more than 400 in place (Utting and Zammit 2006: 18) ranging 
from norm setting to the creation of new markets (Reinicke and Deng 2000; Bull, 
Bøäs and McNeill 2004), the majority (if not all) of which claim to have a broad 
development mandate. 
 
Despite the steady proliferation of global partnerships and their increasing localisation 
very little is known about the way in which public-private partnerships project are 
conceptualised, how they affect their expected beneficiaries, and whether business 
realities and imperatives are actually geared towards meeting the objectives of 
equitable and sustainable development (McFalls 2007). This paper seeks to offer an 
empirical and conceptual contribution of the political processes, limits and potential 
of UN brokered partnerships that seek to deepen or create inclusive and sustainable 
agricultural supply chains in sub-Saharan Africa. More specifically it appraises the 
local processes of partnership brokerage, decision-making mechanisms and project 
implementation within the UNDP Growing Sustainable Business Initiative (GSB) in 
Kenya.  
 
Anchored in the Global Compact and managed by the UNDP the GSB seeks to 
facilitate  ‘business-led enterprise solutions to poverty in advancement of the 
Millennium Development Goals’ (GSB website) with the specific intent of increasing 
access by the poor to goods and services, employment and livelihood opportunities. 
The organisational features of the GSB conform to a typical multistakeholder 
arrangement coordinated by a country broker and relying on the participation of 
governments, local and international businesses and civil society for policy 
deliberation and individual projects’ appraisal. Since its creation in 2002, the GSB has 
expanded its partnership portfolio to twelve developing countries1 across the 
continents of Africa, Europe and Asia. The GSB projects are market led, this means 
that the factor endowments and supposed comparative advantage of less developed 
and developing countries make agriculture, food chains development for export or 
local markets for those at the bottom of the pyramid  (Prahalad 2005) some of the 
                                                 
1
 Madagascar, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, Macedonia, Moldova, Mozambique, Serbia, Turkey, 
Cambodia, Indonesia. The GSB platforms in Ethiopia, Angola and El Salvador were abandoned.  
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principal areas of interest and potential intervention. To date, out of 48 local projects 
listed on the GSB website 20 focus specifically on the development of local and 
global supply chains for fresh fruits, vegetables, nuts, seeds, diary, fish and even the 
establishment of a local fast food chain in Madagascar.  
 
In an effort to determine the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the GSB arrangements at 
country level and its effects upon smallholders and rural poor, in a first stage, the 
paper offers an overview of the GSB and its underlying ethos, it then contextualises 
the initiative at local level by looking at the actors and processes that steer the 
meaning and determine the feasibility of sustainable business models for poverty 
reduction. Thereafter, based on empirical research conducted in Kenya the paper 
narrates and appraises the limits and potential of two partnership projects targeting the 
export market for macadamia nuts and the local market for mango fruit juice.  The 
paper argues that the economic rationale driving the partnership projects have not 
reached out or significantly benefited Kenyan nuts and mangoes producers. By way of 
a conclusion it will be suggested that the potential of the GSB needs to be rooted in 
more open and transparent deliberation and implementation processes and a more 
equal recalibration between business interests and development needs.  
 
2. What is the UNDP Growing Sustainable Business Initiative?  
 
Inception  
 
It was in the occasion of the Global Compact’s second Policy Dialogue on ‘Business 
and Sustainable Development’ that the concept of decentralised partnerships with a 
development dimensions took a concrete form. The Policy Dialogue’s group on how 
companies contribute to sustainable development put forward the idea of contacting a 
group of companies which would be willing to explore sustainable business 
opportunities in less developed countries (LDCs) and to work with stakeholders from 
those countries to develop an understanding of local needs (UN Global Compact 2002 
a). The Policy Dialogue participants agreed upon the idea of accelerating business 
expansion in LDCs and contributing to the eradication of poverty through profits, 
thereafter an initiative entitled ‘Sustainable Investment and Access to Basic Services 
in LDCs’ was constituted. Chaired by Sir Mark Moody Stuart, former CEO of Shell 
and Chair of Business Action for Sustainable Development (BASD), the group was 
reconvened in a follow-up dialogue in Paris where the possibility was examined of a 
voluntary commitment by Global Compact’s signatories to grow a proportion of their 
business activities in LDCs in line with the principles of sustainability. The idea was 
then envisaged to become a multi-stakeholder partnership with the twin aims of 
contributing to economic growth and socio-economic development (UN Global 
Compact 2002 b).  
 
In the run up the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development, Sir Mark 
Moody Stuart was invited by the Compact’s Executive Director, Georg Kell, to 
identify a number MNCs who would be interested in expanding their investment 
portfolio in sub-Saharan Africa and be part of a ‘solution in support of sustainable 
development’ (Interview, 6 June 2005). The influential position of the BASD’s Chair 
guaranteed that a number of companies responded positively to the proposed 
initiative, and the Global Compact in cooperation with UNCTAD, UNEP and UNDP 
seized this opportunity to present an embryonic overview of the initiative in 
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Johannesburg. At a high-level roundtable chaired by UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan and attended by head of states, business leaders and prominent international 
NGOs the Growing Sustainable Business Initiative was launched and was proclaimed 
by the Secretary General as the ‘most promising pathway in overcoming the poverty 
trap…and give hope and opportunity to the world’s poorest’ (UN Global Compact 
2002 c). Shortly after the Summit, UNDP, one of the Compact’s core agencies, was 
delegated with the task of running the initiative, developing it further and decentralise 
it to UNDP’s Country Offices. The choice of devolving the partnership initiative to 
the UNDP’s Division for Business Partnerships was described by a UN official as 
‘natural’, since the Office of the Secretary General seeks to promote universal values, 
whereas UNDP is the operational development arm of the UN at country level 
(Interview, UN, 9 December 2005). 
 
Aims 
  
The official launch of the initiative corresponded to a clearer delineation of the main 
aims and immediate objectives underpinning the idea of forging partnerships for 
poverty through business models. In the first official document co-produced by the 
Compact and UNDP the overall contribution of the GSB was identified as being a 
means to alleviate poverty and promote sustainable development by ‘facilitating 
sustainable business and investment by the private sector through a process of multi-
stakeholder engagement with governments, civil society, the UN family and other 
development organisations’ (UN Global Compact and UNDP). Here, ‘sustainable 
investment’ is understood as a standard business activity such as FDI, production or 
sales which is based on accepted measures of social, environmental, economic and 
political responsibility as defined by the Global Compact’s ten principles, but it is also 
a type of investment which involves and is supported by a number of state and non-
state actors (Sandbrook 2002). 
 
More specifically, the initiative wants to advance three interrelated goals. First, it 
seeks to facilitate increased investment activities by assisting business partners along 
with communities and relevant stakeholders through an investment cycle which 
encompasses opportunity identification, business model development, co-financing 
and implementation (Day, Gandhi and Giersing 2005 a). Second, it wants to prove 
that ‘sustainable business’ projects can mitigate widespread poverty through the 
creation or revival of enterprises, supply chains, thus allowing the poor to access 
needed goods, services, employment opportunities and sources of income (Day, 
Gandhi and Giersing 2005 b). Ultimately, the GSB aspires to support projects, which 
are relevant to local contexts and are aligned with national priorities to achieve the 
MDGs, thereby making something happen for the needs of a nation and the poorest in 
it. These three aims appear to position the GSB as a unique UN initiative that wants to 
move beyond philanthropy and corporate social responsibility offering a value 
proposition that yields economic as well social returns.  
 
Structure  
 
Operationally the GSB is coordinated at global, regional and country levels. Globally 
a small team of UNDP advisors, based within the UNDP’s Business Partnerships 
Division, are expected to encourage international companies to take action; they also 
assess the merits and weaknesses of local partnership proposals, coordinate country-
 5 
level activities and share country experiences. Since 2007 the role of Business 
Outreach Coordinator and GSB Regional Coordinator were created as meso-level 
points of contact between the GSB headquarters in New York, Regional Bureaux and 
GSB brokers to provide strategic advise, expertise and knowledge of market 
conditions, partnership projects replicability and feasibility in particular region or 
geographic areas.  At country level, where the partnerships unfold, a GSB Delivery 
Mechanism is established in selected LDCs ‘where stakeholders agree that there is a 
need for such programme and where the UNDP Country Office is committed to 
supporting it’ (Day et al. 2005 a). The GSB Delivery Mechanism consists of a full-
time GSB broker, who acts as an intermediary for the various stakeholders and 
oversees the research arm (i.e. the broker and UNDP inters), and assists stakeholders 
in the creation of socio-economic background studies, feasibility studies and the 
identification of sources of funding. The decision-making mechanism through which 
the GSB’s targets are set, projects approved, and consensus on the meaning of 
sustainable business is reached, is the GSB Coordinating Group – an umbrella group 
made of government representatives, businesses, NGOs, international organisations 
and relevant bilateral and multilateral donors (UN Global Compact and UNDP 2002). 
 
3. The GSB in Kenya: actors, processes and projects  
 
Following consultation with the Kenyan government, the private sector, the NGO and 
the donor community the UNDP in partnership with UNIDO and the ILO launched 
the Global Compact and the GSB in Kenya on the 3rd of May 2005. Both initiatives 
officially took off at the same time, however while the Global Compact Kenyan 
network was only established two years later, the GSB had already identified and 
presented to an invited audience three partnership projects and was keen to establish a 
coordinating group as soon as possible. Although the GSB broker was expected to run 
and co-ordinate both, existing Kenyan Global Compact’s signatories were encouraged 
to conceptualise and initiate sustainable business projects (i.e. Tetra Pak and 
Vestergaard Frandsen) while companies who expressed an interest in the GSB did not 
have to sign up to the Global Compact or, at times, they were not even made aware of 
the Compact and its principles. The initial, almost exclusive, focus on the systematic 
development of the GSB in Kenya was not solely based on the need to show that the 
idea was viable and ‘pro-poor’ but also because pushing two separate initiatives, 
which for political and practical reasons could not be more closely linked, was 
proving to be an onerous task for a single civil servant. In other words, the Global 
Compact was perceived as ‘extra work’. 
 
The Brokers  
 
Within the GSB mechanism and processes, the role of the broker is crucial in defining 
the ‘success of the initiative’ (GSB Operation Manual 2007). The broker is not only 
expected to identify and co-ordinate individual projects while minimising the risks 
and cost associated with an investment he/she is also expected to make sure that these 
projects have a clear development dimension and are aligned with the goals of the 
UNDP – particularly the MDGs. In Kenya a new GSB broker was appointed on a 
yearly basis; the first two brokers fitted within the general UNDP job description of a 
candidate with extensive experience in the private sector, the capacity to provide 
analysis of business models including investment analysis and financial modelling, 
and the ability to convene coalition of partners. Both brokers worked for a number of 
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years in the private sector and although interested in development they did not have 
any experience or a nuanced (non-quantitative) understanding of poverty reduction 
strategies and interventions. An interview with a broker confirmed that the kind of 
development sought after by the civil servant and the GSB was primarily, if not 
exclusively, economic, once it was stated that ‘our priority is to develop new markets, 
creating employment and providing income…development will trickle down’ 
(Interview, UNDP, 6 July 2006).  
 
Brokers are also expected to establish the coordinating group, identify business 
partners interested in developing a sustainable business projects and forge linkages 
between businesses and local NGOs. The ability to act as a nodal point and 
partnership broker appears to necessitate an in depth knowledge not only of local 
market conditions but also of the various development institutions, groups and actors 
working in the country and often carrying out work away from the capital city where 
the UN compound is based. Although, UNDP Kenya had a long tradition of 
collaboration with a wide range of local private and public groups all the appointed 
brokers have been foreign nationals who, upon appointment, have been required to 
map and thereafter make contact with ‘key’ partners. The apparent lack of ‘local’ 
knowledge on the part of the brokers has led a former UN civil servant to propose for 
the initiative to be de-linked entirely from UNDP and be run exclusively by local 
actors with the necessary expertise and familiarity with local conditions, development 
actors and national development priorities (Personal Communication, 12 March 
2007).  
       
Coordinating Group  
 
The Kenyan coordinating group was established shortly after the GSB’s launch, its 
members had a history of institutional affiliation with the UN or were invited to 
become members by virtue of the scale of their involvement in private sector and 
development types of activities. The identification of the right or appropriate 
stakeholders did not seem to conform to the aspiration of closing the democratic 
deficit in global governance; rather, it mirrored concerns such as status, previous 
contacts with UNDP Kenya and the willingness to participate and devote time to the 
GSB processes. Official documentation suggests that these groups should be quite 
heterogeneous and represent a blend of public and private interests; however, on 
closer inspection, those who participate in the processes of deliberation are largely 
private sector representatives, and a handful of local NGOs with long-standing 
interests in facilitating market expansion and deepening2 such as AMSCO and the 
Gatsby Trust (KGT) in Kenya. The participation of donors, international development 
institutions and NGOs can be best described as sporadic whereas union and the 
Kenyan National Federation of Agricultural Producers had been simply forgotten 
(Interview, UNDP, 6 July 2006). Furthermore, despite recognising the importance of 
including government officials within the coordinating mechanisms, the participation 
of public officials has been limited and inconsistent. 
 
When questioned about the representativity of the group the emerging consensus was 
that the supposed beneficiaries of the partnerships did not have to be included in 
                                                 
2
 Ronen Shamir (2004) differentiates these NGOs from counter-hegemonic social movements referring 
to them as Market Non-Governmental Organisations (MaNGOs). 
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deliberations. One current member of the coordinating group commented that ‘when 
you bring the farmers in they tend to bring their own interests and they are not very 
objective. We, on the other hand have no direct or vested interest, we think about the 
whole community and not about individuals…I would feel as if I let the farmers down 
if I did not attend a meeting’ (Interview, KGT, 14 July 2006). Another member from 
the private sector added that ‘the coordinating group is broad enough and if a labour 
union was to be invited to join they would not represent the non-unionised farmers’ 
(Interview, Export Promotion Council, 20 July 2006). By the same token, the GSB 
broker never questioned whether the group could be made more ‘inclusive’ or 
whether the beneficiaries, those who do not normally have a voice in society, should 
be consulted at any point of the partnership processes, preferring instead to focus 
her/his attention on targets (i.e. number of projects, commercial feasibility and 
potential outcomes) rather than participatory mechanisms of deliberation and 
implementation. Furthermore, once the coordinating group was established with an 
official list of names published in the GSB Kenya brochure entry points to join or 
expand the group appeared to be immediately restricted.  
 
Identification, Endorsement and Project Portfolio  
 
During the early stages of institutional development UNDP New York contacted 
various foreign companies and multinational corporations who would be potentially 
interested in developing sustainable business models in Kenya and then passed on the 
details to the GSB Kenya. At the same time, the local broker was also urged to contact 
foreign companies and small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) in an effort to 
establish a preliminary project portfolio. Both strategies showed early signs of success 
which was further compounded once the Coordinating Group member started to 
spread the word amongst their contacts about the GSB business proposition and the 
possibilities of co-funding it offered for market research and socio-economic 
feasibility studies. The successive broker was determined to reach out to a wider 
audience and, in collaboration with a small team of UNDP interns, contacts with the 
local media were made and boisterous articles on the GSB appeared on the Kenya 
Times and the Daily Nations in 2006, which were later followed by a nomination at 
the Africa Investor Awards 2006. At this point the broker was no longer on the 
lookout for potential business partners as the UNDP was being directly contacted by 
local enterprises (Interview, UNDP, 6 July 2006). 
 
As expression of interest started to dramatically increase the GSB Kenya pioneered 
the development of more specific guidelines to assess the economic and social impact 
of proposed partnership projects. Initial screening was undertaken by the broker on 
the basis of a clear and equitable delineation of the business case and social impact of 
each initial proposal, ‘a project which does not present a convincing business case, 
despite having strong social impact, cannot be considered a GSB project. Similarly, a 
project that makes business sense but cannot sufficiently demonstrate sustainable 
development impact will not be endorsed by the GSB’ (Personal Communication, 7 
July 2006). In a second stage, in order to be considered for formal GSB endorsement 
and potential co-funding every business was requested to outline in writing or 
verbally expose to the Coordinating Group the project description, the business case 
and financial plan for engaging in a new venture or market development as well as 
indicating its supposed development impact, which for the majority of proposed 
projects equated to an assumption of potential rise in employment and income or (see 
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Annex 1). It is important to note that businesses were ultimately left with the 
responsibility to select the supposed beneficiaries independently of whether these fell 
within the category of ‘poor’ or not. Furthermore, while the project proposals gave 
estimates of employment creation, approximations on real income increases, scope for 
human capital development and a commitment to compliance with labour and 
environmental standards were not required and, in the majority of cases, omitted.  
 
Between 2005 and 2007, 18 projects were presented and positively reviewed during 
the bi-monthly Coordinating Group meetings (see Annex 1). Eight partnerships were 
subsequently de-linked from GSB Kenya and pursued without GSB assistance 
because companies did not need the platform and co-funding or were developed in 
other countries, for example, Tetra Pak moved to the GSB Tanzania to explore the 
development of an integrated supply chain for UHT milk. Out of the remaining 
(officially endorsed) ten partnerships, those ‘dumped from New York’ with MNCs 
such as Voxiva, Freeplay and Microsoft did not take off due to low commitment, 
diverging interests and communication problems arising from the fact that some of the 
companies did not have offices in East Africa.  
 
Unlike the original expectations, the currently active seven partnerships are those who 
might also hold the greatest developmental potential not only because they are led by 
Kenyan companies but also because they intend to create explicit linkages with local 
firms and, in the case of agricultural interventions, small producers (Jenkins 2005: 
252). The preponderance of proposed and existing projects targeting the agricultural 
sector and smallholders is not casual; agriculture and food production constitute the 
backbone of Kenya’s economy with more than two million outgrowers, labourers and 
brokers working to meet the demands of local consumption and the export market 
(Dolan and Humphrey 2004; Brown and Sanders 2007). However, the sectoral 
concentration of agricultural and food projects did not arise primarily out of concerns 
for poverty mitigation in rural areas, where poverty is highest and agricultural 
production is the main form of subsistence (Freeman, Ellis and Allison 2004), but 
because market demands and research established that substantial returns could be 
made from smallholders’ flexible and cost-efficient production.  
 
4. The GSB Kenya in action: global nuts and local mangoes  
 
How do the GSB sustainable business models work? The approval and endorsement 
of two distinct projects, a global supply chain for macadamia nuts and a local supply 
chain for mangoes occurred in 2005; they were amongst the first group of projects 
formally endorsed by the GSB Kenya and the Coordinating Group and, as 2008, they 
are both still listed as ‘active’ in the GSB global website as well as in UNDP Kenya 
website. Although the GSB Kenya, is still in its infancy, experimenting with the 
brokerage of partnerships, project implementation and supervision, the narratives and 
developments of both project indicate that global and local market demands have 
resulted in both projects failing to bear any financial and non-financial benefits to 
their expected beneficiaries – the smallholders in Embu and Malindi.    
 
Global Entrepreneurs and Macadamia Nuts   
 
Between 2002 and 2004, as part of its expansion strategy, the international trading 
company Global Entrepreneurs International (GEI), co-sponsored by NORAD and 
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funded by AIESEC executives, set up a new office in Kenya, Global Entrepreneurs 
Africa, in an effort to open up opportunities for the export of locally produced spices, 
beans and nuts.  In 2005 the company identified macadamia nuts as the prime product 
for its export activities. Research undertaken by the company showed that local 
production for exports had doubled between 2000 and 2005 raising from 4,900 metric 
tons to approximately 10,000 metric tons and that the local production and processing 
market in the hands of Kenya Nut Company had the potential to be made more 
competitive. Global forecast indicate not only that macadamia constituted 2% of the 
world market for nuts but also that Northern demands for healthier food products was 
set to rise. The global scoping exercise also was found that the global market for the 
product was dominated by Australian and South African producers and the prices 
were highly fluctuating and dictated by criteria such as quality and demand. Within 
this context the idea of developing a value-added niche market for organic macadamia 
nuts and oil emerged and the export company Global Nuts was established in early 
2005 as a Kenyan incorporated company wholly owned by Global Entrepreneurs 
Africa.   
 
Once established, Global Nuts started to look for producers with sufficient supplies to 
initiate its export activities and establish market linkages with wholesale buyers in 
Europe. During this phase, the company was contacted by the financial arm of Embu 
Farmers Co-operative Society which owned Mt. Kenya Nuts – a factory which buys 
macadamia nuts from 4000 farmers, processes and packages the nuts for sale to the 
international market. The factory, endowed with the technology to dry, grade, crack 
and package the nuts was not able to sell current and an overly generous surplus stock 
and, unable to meet loan re-payments it was risking bankruptcy and delayed payments 
to farmers. Global Nuts decided to source macademia nuts from Mt. Kenya Nuts who 
‘promised extremely optimistic supply forecast’ (Interview, 13 July 2008), however 
the first transactions were hampered by the fact that Northern buyers did not have 
much confidence in the quality of Kenyan nuts and Mt. Kenya Nuts was unable to 
deliver the specified quantities of 14 containers – by November 2005, thanks to a cash 
advance only 4 containers were shipped to Europe and the Middle East. Visits to the 
factory established that much of the inventory was made up of raw nuts (e.g. nuts 
originating from shaken trees), purchases of nuts from farmers and middlemen were 
made on a had hoc basis, the equipment was not being used correctly as the factory 
staff did not know how to operate the machines and the factory was in need of 
thorough clean up. Global Nuts determined that capital and human resources were 
needed to resuscitate the fortunes of its main supplier.  
 
Contacts had already been made with the GSB in the summer of 2005 but neither 
Global Nuts nor the GSB broker could clearly determine how the UNDP could 
provide assistance, the project was however included in the portfolio’s pipeline. The 
definition of a GSB sustainable business model with a development dimension 
occurred much later, by accident rather than design. While travelling for business 
Global Nuts was introduced to a Japanese consultant3 from HardNut International 
who had extensive experience in the Kenyan macadamia industry and had worked for 
Kenya Nuts Company (Global Nuts’ main competitor) where he oversaw propagation, 
grafting, harvesting, nuts collection and processing. With the possibility open of 
                                                 
3
 Bilateral relationship between Japan and the Kenyan government dated back to the 1970s when 
Japan’s funding was instrumental in creating the institutions, capacities and infrastructures needed for 
the creation of a Kenyan market for macadamia.  
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having a consultant to provide advice and production and processing, while the 
marketing was already being developed by Global Entrepreneurs (i.e. website, 
packaging, publicity, trade fairs), Global Nuts re-approached the GSB with a 
preliminary plan for co-funding the consultant and was encouraged by the broker to 
finalise the project proposal.  
 
The ex-ante project proposal was developed entirely by Global Nuts with input not 
being provided by smallholders or the factory board whose relations with Global Nuts 
were increasingly strained by signs of internal instability and poor management, the 
refusal of Global Nuts’ financial tendering and the little room for manoeuvre accorded 
to a production and quality consultant installed in the factory by Global 
Entrepreneurs. The project proposal however, had, according the GSB broker, a 
‘strong’ business and development proposition (Interview, 13 July 2006). The 
business case was centred on the assumption that increased quality, direct supply from 
farmers as opposed to middlemen and improved knowledge of manufacturing 
processes and the long-term plan for an organic niche market would have an impact 
on macadamia prices; however it was acknowledged that globally more suppliers 
were entering the market. The development case had two components; first it assumed 
higher and more predictable sources of income for the co-operative’s farmers through 
higher dividends and the premium ensuing from organic certification and higher 
income opportunities for non-cooperative farmers; second it included, with little 
details and no clear partners in place, capacity building elements such as education on 
the industry, sustainable husbandry4 and loyalty programmes with the factory and the 
organisation of farmers into groups  (Personal Communication, Global Entrepreneurs 
Project Proposal, 14 July 2006). When it was clarified that the consultant’s role would 
be that of determining profit sharing along the supply chain and designing training 
and loyalty programmes for ‘the farmers’, in June 2006 the Coordinating Group 
approved the project and a sum of $ 10,000 was set aside to co-fund5 the consultancy 
(GSB 2006 a). 
 
At the time when fieldwork was conducted in Embu July 2006, Global Entrepreneurs’ 
food engineer had prepared a detailed report on the numerous deficiencies that were 
hindering the processing processes but was not allowed to implement any changes, the 
factory did not allow any visits while Mt. Kenya Nuts’ production manager, who 
agreed to be interviewed outside the factory stated that ‘we are a young factory, we 
need help but the board of directors is too political and it is unlikely anything will 
change’ (Interview, 27 July 2006). The farmers, unaware of any partnership project 
taking place, had not seen any visible changes. They continued to supply small 
quantities nuts to the brokers and/or the co-operative for 15 to 20 KSh/Kg depending 
on the distance to the collection centres and the need for cash, while continuing to 
intercrop to secure income and personal consumption (i.e. coffee, beans, maize, 
bananas, cassavas). Trust that macadamia would provide higher income was 
dismissed in the light of the low number of trees per household (3 to 8) and limited 
cultivation space, the seasonality of the fruit, the mistrust that the co-operative would 
                                                 
4
 The sustainability aspect of the project was not only relegated to ‘strict environmental and ecological 
guidelines’ free from chemical and pesticides (Personal Communication, Global Entrepreneurs Project 
Proposal, 14 July 2006), but it also envisaged the recycling of the nuts’ shells and use them as fuel.  
5
 Additional funding to follow up on the consultant’s recommendation was expected to come from 
NORAD (US$ 20,000) and Global Entrepreneurs Africa in the form of human resources (US$ 22,535). 
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be in a position to pay a ‘fair’ price (this was determined at around 80 KSh/Kg) and 
the absence of channels for smallholders to voice their complaints.  
 
In Nairobi, while Global Nuts was already envisaging investing in its own processing 
factory in the capital’s export processing zones, it continued to hold talks with the 
GSB Coordinating Group about Mt. Kenya Nuts and the Embu farmers but only 
signalled that for financial reasons the factory was unable to produce nuts for the new 
season (GSB 2006 b). The Coordinating Group agreed that the Minister of 
Cooperatives should be consulted but even with this intervention the project was filed 
in 2007 when the UNDP determined that ‘the co-operative, despite initial assurance, 
was not in practice interested in providing benefits to its members’ (UNDP 2007: 47). 
Global Nuts continues its operations in Kenya, it has signed up to the local Global 
Compact network, and it is still listed within the GSB project portfolio but in order to 
ensure the survival of its own business it with withdrew its ‘assistance’ to Mt. Kenya 
Nuts and the co-operative’s farmers. The GSB could not explain how the project 
could have been run differently, but its plausible to infer that issue of ownership 
(Witte and Reinicke 2005: 44-46) was not adequately addressed and failure to bring 
the partners and beneficiaries to the discussion table might have largely contributed to 
the demise of the proposed project.  
 
KGT, Kevian and Local Mangoes  
 
Unlike the partnership initiated by Global Entrepreneurs, the idea of initiating a 
supply chain for mangoes departed from the work that the Kenya Gatsby Trust had 
undertaken in support of facilitating market access for small-scale mango producers in 
the coastal region of Kenya. The Gatsby Trust’s interest in mango production 
developed before the GSB was created. The overarching objective of the Trust, in 
fact, is to catalyse sustainable wealth creation in the poorest areas of Africa and the 
coastal districts of Malindi and Magarini are two of them one of them. In 2001 a 
series participatory appraisal studies were initiated and found that in the region 
mangoes were overproduced and that they were not being sold due to poor quality 
(i.e. the fruits were infested) and little access to markets, farmers were not organised, 
a lack of secure sources of income incurred exploitative transaction with middlemen 
with each fruit being paid as little as KSh 1, and that Ministry of Agriculture had 
provided little or no extension services or post-harvest facilities to smallholders.  
 
Between 2003 and 2005, with funding secured from the Gatsby Trust and the JJ 
Charitable Trust, KGT first encouraged mango growers to engage in common 
marketing efforts and improved techniques, second, under an arrangement 
coordinated by the local KGT office, 61 youths were privately trained by Bayer and 
the Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) in spraying trees against pest 
while more than 200 farmers received advice on pruning and how to minimise the risk 
of infection (GT n/d). Within two years farmers were organised into13 groups with 
membership of 253 and 26 private extension service providers, furthermore thirteen 
demonstration were set up, a system of farm input supplies with a credit component 
was put in place and a private extension manual was developed by KARI as part of 
the capacity building elements of the project; by 2005 KARI also enabled one group 
to receive quality assurance certification. During this first phase, funding from the 
Swiss sustainable development foundation BioVision also enabled a parallel research 
partnership between KGT and the International Centre of Insect Physiology and 
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Ecology (ICIPE) in order to develop a non-chemical pest spray based on natural 
ingredients such as peppers and elements of the indigenous neem tree.   
 
Once the farmers were trained and organised and the quality of fresh mangoes was 
deemed suitable for sale, even if quality assurance mechanisms needed to be better 
defined, grading was not possible and collection points remained rudimentary, the 
second phase of the project went ahead and focussed on linking the local mangoes 
market with buyers. Amongst the interested buyers contacted by KGT figured Del 
Monte and local supermarket chain Uchumi, whereas the former did not finalise the 
agreement, the latter did buy some of the mangoes but when Uchimi went bankrupt 
the farmers were temporarily left with no buyers.  In a moment of ‘panic’, whilst 
looking for alternative buyers in 2005 the KGT was introduced to the GSB and the 
first broker put KGT in touch with the Nairobi-based juice producer Kevian 
(Interview, KGT, 14 July 2007). At the time, Kevian had invested in a fruit processing 
plant in Thika (50 Km North of Nairobi) in an effort to decrease high inventory costs 
and avoid heavy taxation on imported concentrate by producing its own concentrate 
for local consumption and export. The contacts established by the GSB proved to be 
successful as Kevian was interested in sourcing local mangoes, hence KGT took the 
lead in facilitating a meeting between Kevian, 26 group leaders and 3 extension 
workers and the issues of quality, quantity and delivery dates were discussed. 
 
The project was discussed and formally endorsed by the GSB Coordinating Group in 
October 2005 even if the factory had not been completed and uncertainties remained 
over who would be supplying mangoes to Kevian, though KGT hoped that a deal with 
the smallholders in Malindi could be finalised; this was reflected in the project 
description which vaguely mentioned that ‘the key beneficiaries would be small scale 
farmers in specific district in the Easter, Central and Coastal and Rift Valley areas’ 
and the addition of GTZ to the partnership who, with self-funding for the project 
(GTZ PPP Fund), was entrusted with the responsibility of looking for more suppliers 
of high quality mangoes in the central districts. According to the GSB broker, the 
proposal also lacked overall specificity, as it was not clear whether the project would 
be economically viable and how the quality of the mangoes would be improved 
(Interview, 16 July 2006). When Kevian attended the GSB Coordinating Group 
meetings clearer information on the direction of the project could not be obtained but 
the company continued to build a case for the need to lobby the government to 
remove excise duties on tax and water (GSB Kenya 2005).  
 
In summer of 2006 the factory was almost completed and with a mango creamer 
ready to be installed negotiations with the original beneficiaries, the producers in 
Malindi, were re-opened. Kevian was prepared to pay 13 Ksh/Kg or 6.5 Ksh/ per 
mango, however it also expected for the producers to pay for transport costs which, 
including packing, loading and unloading were estimated to be as high as 5 Ksh per 
mango thereby making a net gain of 1.5 Ksh/per mango. Despite extensive research 
with the eight most reliable transport companies was conducted no deal was struck. 
As the KGT project programme officer stated:   
 
‘…If Kevian is not prepared to pay for the transport costs 
that the partnership would have to come to an end. The 
export market is much more lucrative as the farmers would 
gain a net profit of 6 Ksh per kg of mango and the farmers 
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would not have to incur transport costs. The only way for 
the economic partnership to be resurrected would be for 
Kevian to consider absorbing the transport costs, however 
Kevian is not a philanthropist and this alternative would 
have to make ‘business sense’, especially considering 
ascending costs of fuel. At the bottom line of the 
partnership economic considerations need to be prioritised. 
The processing factory is 50 km away from Nairobi…10 
hours drive away from Malindi…’  
 
Despite the setback, and with no particular concerns over the smallholders in Malindi 
which continued to be independently assisted by KGT6, the GSB continued to support 
the Kevian project. In 2006 members of Coordinating Group visited the factory and 
were pleased ‘with the opportunity to see the factory processing passion fruit and the 
state of the art equipment’ (GSB 2006 b). In the meanwhile GTZ was able to trace 
mango producers closer to Thika and the beneficiaries were re-identified according to 
cost and quantity criteria and the districts of Emebere and Embu were chosen to start 
anew a farmers’ training programme. However, even if new smallholders were 
identified and the Ministry of Agriculture had agreed to offer extension services, there 
was no defined capacity building plan in place that would have ensured that the ‘new 
beneficiaries’ would be in a position to meet the quality and quantity demands 
imposed by Kevian.  
 
5. Discussion: The Limits of Sustainable Business Models  
 
Both case studies illustrated that the project definition and the project direction (the 
supposed direction of development) was ultimately defined by businesses and dictated 
by economic priorities with UNDP not raising objections or questions about the 
marginalisation of the beneficiaries, their role in the projects, their expectations and 
knowledge. At no point the intended smallholders were invited to the discussions and 
empowered to make basic decisions about their livelihoods – economic opportunities 
were catapulted from the outside and changes to the project plans were defined in 
Nairobi. Were nuts and mangoes the most profitable produce of the smallholders?  
Omitting the question of who defines and drives sustainable business projects is to 
reinforce the apolitical notion that partnerships are ‘neutral’, infinitely inclusive and 
that all the ‘stakeholders’ and beneficiaries involved have an equal say. An emerging 
body of critical scholarship on corporate social responsibility and public-private 
partnerships has observed that in multistakeholder forums and meetings those who 
normally don’t have a voice in society are also the ones excluded from the 
discussions; furthermore, even when these groups seldom have a voice, as in the case 
of the farmers in Malindi, ‘power relationships between stakeholder continue to shape 
the issues raised, the alliances that are formed and the issues that are identified’ 
(Prieto-Carrón et al. 2006: 984).  
 
Second, the question of distribution of benefits and costs deserves some attention. As 
Blowfield (2007) asks, what assumptions can be drawn about the impact of these 
interventions? Within the GSB model, lead companies gain from the association with 
                                                 
6
 It linked smallholders to a Belgian wholesaler and is looking into donor’s fund to set up a pulp-
processing factory in Malindi, at the same time it has started research into the possibility of establishing 
the more lucrative market for dried mangoes.  
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the UNDP name and the publicity that comes with it, here the reputational and 
credibility gains are substantial and should not be underestimated. Furthermore, as the 
cases of Global Entrepreneurs and Kevian testify the GSB opened up to businesses 
opportunities for networking and partnerships formation, it offered free guidance on 
the development of a business plan, and was instrumental in allowing businesses to 
bid for or acquire public or private funding and financing. The gains accruing to the 
private sector are not only implicit in the GSB value-proposition but are also 
cultivated because failing partnerships could potentially undermine the entire 
initiative, its expansion plans and donors’ funds. (In)avertedly the GSB platform also 
created a political space, at the Coordinating Group meetings, where, on occasions, 
the private sector could discuss the kind of policy changes, which would be required 
to foster more profitable and efficient economic transactions (i.e. lower taxes).  
 
Similar or commensurable benefits have not been shared with smallholders.  At the 
bottom of the supply chains some opportunities for smallholders have been created 
and equally removed. The viability of a sustainable business model is, first and 
foremost, dependent upon costs; beneficiaries are ‘picked’ because they can produce 
what a company wants at a price and quality that is deemed favourable by the buyer. 
However, even if the prices paid tend to be higher than what middlemen offer, buyers 
have the power and capacity (i.e. resources and networks) to relocate their 
‘developmental responsibilities’ towards more cost-efficient producers. What the 
cases presented suggest is that smallholders’ wages continued to be determined by 
formal and informal market transactions with pressure for lower costs potentially 
eroding their income base; employment opportunities remained seasonal, gendered, 
and dependent on fluctuating demand while the risks and insecurities of global and 
local competition evidently trickling down to the beneficiaries/farmers. In the light of 
this, the ‘beneficiaries’ of the projects said that survival was dependent not only on 
new market linkages but on family remittances, crops’ diversification and the 
identification of work opportunities away from the country side. Hence, even the 
modest contributions that sustainable business model and the GSB claim to bring in 
the advancement of the MDGs or sustained poverty reduction can be open to 
challenges. 
 
This however, is not to dismiss entirely the potential value that sustainable business 
models might yield for the processes of development and the livelihood of 
smallholders. The new GSB guidelines for agro-food partnership specify that several 
capacity building component should be identified prior to the development of a supply 
chain and suggest that quality and productivity improvements, building trust amongst 
smallholders and organise farmers groups should be explicitly integrated within 
project proposals (GSB 2007: 43). With businesses or governments not always in a 
position to offer such services the delegation of this responsibility is expected to fall 
in the hands of service delivery organisations and NGOs such as GTZ, USAID, 
CARE, Gatsby Trust and TechnoServe. The introduction of this requirement is to be 
welcomed as opposed to the previous ‘anything goes’ approach, however it also point 
to an unambiguous trend towards the privatisation of development. The private 
‘subcontracting’ of capacity building, implicit in the new guidelines, might benefit 
some farmers for some time as they are not long-term interventions, they focus on 
narrow groups defined by private (and often foreign) institutional priorities and are 
accountable to donors not the people they intend to serve (Petras 2007; Hearn 2007). 
Nonetheless, the emphasis placed on organising disparate producers into groups might 
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actually have longer lasting effects in that it offers some scope for the politically and 
economically marginalised to use voice during negotiations with buyers.  
 
The missed opportunity that the GSB Kenya has failed to foster is a closer and more 
systematic partnership with local authorities and higher-level governmental bodies, as 
Frynas and Newell (2007: 677) point out ‘even in the most dysfunctional African 
states, with weak government authorities, the state continues to exert an important 
influence on development’. Incorporating more meaningfully public authorities in the 
processes of defining how business interests and developmental priorities might be 
reconciled could potentially contribute to the long-term impact of sustainable business 
models. For example, in the cases discussed lack of transport, inadequate 
infrastructures, information and credit were all identified as factors that hindered the 
furtherance of the partnerships’ developmental dimension and inherently called for 
public policy intervention and the mobilisation of resources for smallholders. 
However, as the GSB is presently instituted a closer alliance between the government 
and private interests might overlook some of these facets while offering scope for 
MNCs or SMEs to advance their own political agenda. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The GSB epitomises an example of proliferating forms of public-private governance, 
and like some of its counterparts such as DFID’s Business Linkages Challenge Fund 
or the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform, its mandate and current global 
project portfolio it is placed in a unique position to affect the welfare of small-scale 
agricultural and food producers in LDCs. Notwithstanding the initiative’s 
experimental and ‘learn as you go’ approach, the paper has sought to demonstrate that 
its degree of inclusiveness is limited, while from the perspective of the beneficiaries 
its development impacts have yet to materialise. What are the implications of these 
findings? 
 
As they are currently conceptualised and implemented the GSB’s interventions are 
prone to perpetrate several concerns that have been identified by the more critical 
literature (Utting 2001; Martens 2007) such as compounding the power of businesses, 
the replacement of the role of governments as a provider of public goods and the 
corollary creation of elitist mode of governance. These new social pacts could be 
perceived as more legitimate and even prove to be more effective if aligned with 
existing or developing public programmes and the expected beneficiaries and 
smallholders in particular were given more voice in the phases of deliberation and 
project implementation. Opening up the GSB’s decision-making decision-making 
mechanism to the beneficiaries of the projects (i.e. group leaders), other non-strategic 
and less complacent ‘stakeholders’ coupled with the consistent involvement of public 
authorities could improve the prospects of communicating and addressing more 
widely the risks, opportunities, positive and negative qualitative impact(s) of each 
project. Finding an operating and feasible governance structure that reaches out and 
empowers the beneficiaries such as smallholders, contractors and employees would 
appear to necessitate a fundamental shift away from the top-down and technocratic 
practices currently in place. As Perez-Aleman (2007: 26) suggests ‘a future 
development agenda that combines social and economic development needs to bring 
in a broad representation, including poorer producers’. 
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A more meaningful recalibration between business interests and development needs to 
be considered in the light of the unpredictable and contradictory outcomes that 
partnerships discussed have produced (and might reproduce). So far, intimate 
relationship have been nurtured with companies with considerable assistance been 
offered to the private sector, while, comparatively, very little attention has been paid 
at the livelihood of those at the lower end of the supply chain. In the context of 
agricultural projects, field visits have been organised or were planned to view 
factories but they have not ventured beyond the factory gates. Creating employment 
and income are some of the postulated benefits that sustainable business models might 
produce but these assumptions need to be verified and followed up while closer 
attention will progressively need to be placed on the quality of employment 
relationships that different partnerships promote and the wider social investment they 
might attract. The GSB does not currently have monitoring or impact assessment 
mechanisms, what is known about ‘development’ is the information that lead-
businesses disclose, but as partnerships develop the UNDP will have to demonstrate 
how and whether the model works not only to the advantage of private partners but 
also for those it seeks to lift out of poverty.  
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Annex 1: Growing Sustainable Business Initiative Project Portfolio 2005-8 
 
Date  Project Partners Project Description  Development 
Objectives  
Beneficiaries 
(Other than lead 
company) 
Progress  
May 2005 Grameen, UNDP.  Introduce a ‘Village 
Phone’ model whereby 
local entrepreneurs who 
purchase a 
telecommunication kit 
from Grameen and its 
partners would provide 
phone services.  
 
Enable access to 
mobile phone 
technology. 
Microfinance 
Institutions, Village 
Operators, local 
communities.  
De-linked from 
GSB Kenya. 
May 2005  SC Johnson, 
Pyrethrum Board 
of Kenya (PBK), 
Approtec (now 
KickStart).  
Attain higher production 
of natural pyrethrum by 
increasing quantity and 
quality. PBK’s role is to 
provide free clonal seeds 
while Approtec market 
and sells MoneyMaker 
pumps.  
 
Increase the income 
raised from the cash 
crop. Give farmers 
access to irrigation 
technology and 
seeds.  
Support 1 million 
people living in 
1$/day.  
De-linked from 
GSB 
Kenya/Active 
May 2005  Tetra Pak, UNDP. Development of a cereal 
based nutritional milk to 
be used by workers, 
people living with 
HIV/AIDS, relief zones, 
refugee camps and 
schools.  
 
Poverty reduction, 
development of the 
private sector, 
improved health and 
education, improved 
trade balance.  
Consumers – urban 
and rural poor.  
De-linked from 
the GSB 
Kenya/ Pilot 
project active 
GSB Tanzania. 
Summer 
2005 
Export Promotion 
Council (EPC), a 
European 
Logistics 
Company, an 
Airline, Co-op 
Bank, GTZ, KGT, 
UNDP.  
Establish cooling 
facilities in production 
areas for perishable 
products, refrigerated 
trucks and storage 
facilities to ensure 
unbroken cold chains to 
EU markets.  
 
Increased income 
and employment, 
higher trade with 
the EU.  
Farmers. De-linked from 
the GSB 
Kenya.   
Summer 
2005 
Global 
Entrepreneurs, 
Global Nuts, Mt. 
Kenya Nuts, 
UNDP. 
Develop a global supply 
chain for macadamia 
nuts and strengthen the 
domestic nuts production 
by working with farmers 
and a local processing 
plant.   
 
Increased income 
and employment, 
higher exports.  
Farmers, local 
processing plant.  
Active 
Summer 
2005 
Vestergaard-
Frandsen, UNDP,  
Development of a water 
purification tool called 
Life Straw, which 
prevents water born 
diseases. The locally 
produced straw costs 
US$3 and lasts one year.  
 
Reduce the 
proportion of people 
without access to 
safe and drinking 
water.  
Consumers - urban 
and rural poor. 
De-linked from 
GSB 
Kenya/Active  
Summer Waving Establishing a mobile Enable access to Urban and rural De-linked from 
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2005 Communications, 
UNDP.   
phone recycling plant to 
manufacture and 
assemble mobile phones 
at lowering 
manufacturing costs than 
market standards.   
 
mobile phone 
technology. 
poor.  the GSB 
Kenya.  
Summer 
2005  
D1 Oil, Total, 
Vanilla 
Development 
Foundation, 
UNDP.  
Increase the production 
of biodisel produced by 
Jatropha plants and 
establish a distribution 
network across 100 
service stations across 
Kenya.  
 
Higher income and 
employment, higher 
production 
capacities, 
sustainable fuels.  
Jatropha farmers and 
biodisel consumers.  
De-linked from 
the GSB 
Kenya.  
October 
2005 
Freeplay Energy, 
Co-operative 
Bank, UNDP.  
Freeplay manufactures 
products that make use 
of self-sufficient energy. 
Establishment of an East 
Africa distributor to sell 
the products to retailers 
who have been granted a 
microfinance loan. The 
retailer will sell the 
products using a two-
part tariff model.  
 
Improved education 
through 
employment 
creation and local 
economic 
development. 
Rural Communities 
with infrequent 
access to electricity.  
Endorsed by 
the GSB 
Kenya/Inactive  
October 
2005 
Kevian, Kenya 
Gatsby Trust, 
Africa Insect 
Science for Food 
and Health 
(ICIPE), Ministry 
of Agriculture, 
GTZ, Kenya 
Federation of 
Agricultural 
Producers, 
UNDP.  
Creation of a supply 
chain for mangoes to 
produce locally, rather 
than import, 
concentrated fruit juice.  
Poverty reduction 
through 
employment 
creation and local 
development. 
Small-scale farmers 
in Eastern, Central, 
coastal and Rift 
Valley area.  
Active  
October 
2005 
Microsoft East 
Africa, 
International 
Financial 
Corporation (IFC) 
SME Solutions 
Centre, IFC 
Grassroots 
Business 
Organization, 
Institute for 
Development 
Studies (Nairobi), 
UNDP.  
Tailoring Microsoft’s 
Small Business 
Accounting - an existing 
productivity tool target 
application - to suit the 
specific needs of SMEs 
in Kenya. 
Poverty reduction 
through 
employment 
creation and local 
development. 
Small and Medium 
Size Enterprises.  
Endorsed by 
the GSB 
Kenya/ 
Inactive  
December 
2005  
Ezipei, UNDP.  Creation of an automated 
low-value financial 
payment system for 
microfinance services.  
Poverty reduction 
through the 
provision of 
microfinance 
services.  
Microfinance 
Institutions.  
De-linked from 
the GSB 
Kenya. 
December 
2005 
Voxiva, Pride 
Africa (Drum 
Development of an 
existing information 
Reduce information 
asymmetries and 
Farmers.  De-linked from 
the GSB 
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Net), UNDP.  platform, which gives 
farmers access to market 
and financial data 
through mobile phones 
rather than the internet.  
 
reduce poverty 
through increased 
sales.  
Kenya/Active 
June 2006 Co-operative 
Insurance 
Company of 
Kenya (CIC), 
Corporate 
Renewal, 
Microfinance 
Institutions 
(MFIs), Nairobi 
Informal Sector 
Confederation, 
UNDP.  
Make available micro-
insurance services to 
informal traders at 
affordable premiums.  
Provide the 
informal sector with 
the protection 
against risks that 
might lower 
productivity, 
income and circles 
of poverty.   
15,000 informal 
traders.  
Active.  
June 2006 Gamewatchers 
Safari (Porini), 
UNDP.  
Provide access to water 
by drilling boreholes 
outside an eco-camp in 
the Mara region.  
Access to safe 
drinking water, 
increased 
employment and 
income through 
tourism 
development.  
Local communities.  Active.  
August 2006 Celtel, Psitek, 
Value added 
Services, 
Packetstream, 
Pride Africa, 
Health Data 
System, MFIs, 
UNDP. 
Increase the usage of 
Celtel’s Simu Yetu 
community payphones 
by launching a next-
generation of data-rich 
GPRS (General Packet 
Radio Service) 
payphone. 
 
Poverty reduction 
through 
employment 
creation (i.e. 13,500 
new payphone 
operators) and local 
economic 
development. 
Payphone operators 
and consumers who 
benefit from lower-
cost access to money 
transfer and other 
commercial 
services. 
Active. 
August 2006  Suera Flowers, 
Africa Now, 
UNDP. 
Develop a supply chain 
for Suera flowers, which 
includes investment in 
cold storage, pack-
houses, vehicles, trucks 
for collection as well as 
financing facilities for 
farmers.  
Poverty reduction 
through 
employment 
creation (from the 
existing 250 to 
5,000 jobs). Access 
to export markets 
through certification 
and quality controls.  
Farmers.  Active.  
2007 Honeycare Africa 
(HCA), UNDP. 
Encourage small farmers 
to begin beekeeping and 
reach the consumers at 
the bottom of the 
pyramid by selling 20g 
honey jars in the slum 
areas in Kenya. 
 
Poverty reduction 
through 
employment 
creation and 
diversified sources 
of income.  
Small-scale farmers, 
beekeepers and 
consumers.  
Active  
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